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Sovereignty in the Modern Age
Robert Brown*
Michael Alexander**
overeignty is a concept as old as politics. Sovereignty means the absolute right of nations to determine and follow their own self interest
and to decide for themselves all issues relating to their domestic conduct. Walter Bagehot, a 19th century English writer, put the matter
rather more elegantly when he stated that: "As with the supreme monarch to which the term refers, sovereignty gives a nation three unassailable rights - the right to be consulted, the right to encourage, and the
right to warn." Bagehot's summary is relevant for modern commentators, because it focused on the relations of one sovereign state with
other sovereign states - sovereignties in conflict. And it points out by
inference the limits of sovereignty, the limits that we are approaching
evermore rapidly in today's shrinking, interdependent world.
The concept of sovereignty as involving the absolute right of nation states over their internal affairs was more useful in those bygone
days when the greatest part of economic life, as well as cultural issues,
was confined to a single state and there was relatively little movement
of people, goods, capital and even technology and ideas between sovereign nations - and therefore less likelihood that the internal affairs of
one state would impinge on another. But in today's global village, we
face an enormous growth in the movements of people, technology and
capital between nations, as well as explosive growth in international
trade. Global trade has more than doubled - from $3.4 trillion to $7.5
trillion - in the nine years from 1985 to 1994.1 And these shifts towards
global inter-reaction are affecting virtually every aspect of our political
and social fabric - culture, human rights, education, and taxation. The
trends are unmistakeable and irreversible, even if they are accompanied, in many parts of the world, by a surge of nationalism and narrow
parochialism.
In this global village, with overlapping national claims, we must
all make a greater effort to get along with each other and reach the
difficult and painful accommodations which are necessary to resolve the
conflicting claims of different sovereignties. The fundamental issue of
course, is that while it is still current legal theory that countries are
totally able to determine their own internal policies, these same internal
* Chairman and Senior Partner, Price Waterhouse.
** Director of Communications, Price Waterhouse.
WORLD EcONOMIc FORUM, World Competitiveness Report, June 1993.
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policies have an impact far beyond their borders and are therefore the
legitimate concern of other sovereign nations. The goal must be to resolve those conflicts peacefully, through negotiation and
accommodation.
CANADA-U.S. TRADE AND INVESTMENT

Nowhere is this potential for both peaceful co-existence and conflict more evident than in the economic relations between Canada and
the United States. These two countries remain the world's largest international trade and investment partners, with a staggering volume of
goods, services, technology, knowledge, capital, and even people flowing
freely across the undefended 3,000 mile common border.
With regard to investments, the official figures show Canada's direct investment in the United States in 1993 amounted to $65 billion,
almost 60 % of total Canadian direct investment: for the United States,
direct investment in Canada amounted to a little under $70 billion
(U.S.), only 14% of foreign direct U.S. investment.' (In fact, these
statistics are misleading because they are based on book values: Canadian investment in the U.S. is more recent, on average, than U.S. investment in Canada, with the latter being worth multiples of its historic
book value).
Canadian exports to the United States have grown from $94 billion in 1985 to $145 billion (Cdn) in 1993, and represent over 80% of
Canada's exports. U.S. exports to Canada in 1993 came to approximately $91 billion (U.S.) representing about 20% of U.S. exports.$ To
put the trade issue in perspective, U.S. exports to Canada amount to
less than 1 1/ % of U.S. GDP. Canada's exports to the United States
come to about 15 % of Canada's GDP - or over 10 times the relative
importance of U.S. exports to Canada. Accordingly, concerns about
U.S.-Canada trade, investment and tax issues tend to be central in Canadian economic and political life, but only peripheral in the United
States: Canada and the United States have an asymmetrical
relationship.

IOECD

Main Economic Indicators, March 1994.
Statistics Canada, Catalogue No. 65-001, Summary of Canadian International Trade (December 1993).
3
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This tremendous and growing flow of trade and capital between
our two countries is a genuine success story, and this success is rooted
in general harmony and cooperation, reinforced by the recent Free
Trade and NAFTA agreements. However, this extraordinary volume of
cross-border activity also brings with it some inevitable strains on trade
and tax issues. It is on these strains that I will concentrate in this paper, although I should say at the start that they have to be seen against
a general background of success in accommodating the separate interests of each country in active cooperation for common benefits.
INTERNATIONAL

TAX RULES OF THE ROAD

Before turning to some examination of tax issues currently in conflict between Canada and the United States, it would be helpful to define the very general rules of the road that are supposed to apply in
dealing with conflicts in the taxation area between nations. These rules
are found, first of all, in the actual history of international tax relations, and secondly and more specifically in the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) model tax treaty and its
extensive commentary.4
With respect to international capital investments, the general rule
is that the host country for the investment or business has the primary
right of taxing the income therefrom. The second country - the country
in which the investor who provided the capital is located - may also tax
that income flow from the investment, but generally on the basis of
recognizing the tax of the first country. This is done in very general
terms by providing a foreign tax credit, in which the country of the
investor allows a credit against its own tax for the tax already paid on
that income in the foreign country. Accordingly, this second country
will only obtain tax revenue to the extent that its tax on such income
exceeds that of the first country, the host country for the investment.
In a universe where corporate tax rates are tending to converge,
there is frequently little additional tax room left to the second country.
Indeed, for a multitude of reasons, very few countries derive significant
tax revenues from the taxation of foreign source income. (In practice,
the host country for the investment has an incentive to increase its tax
burden up to the taxes that would be levied on the income in the country of the investor, since by so doing they do not provide any disincentive to the investor but merely mop up tax revenues that would otherwise go to another nation.) There is, however, an alternative approach
to this issue, in which the country of the investor short circuits all of
the necessarily complex calculations underlying the foreign tax credit,
and simply provides an exemption for foreign source income.
" As
(1977).

outlined in Model Double Taxation Convention on Income and on Capital, OECD
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A number of influential commentators in the United States several
decades ago argued vociferously that the primary right of tax should
belong to the country from which the capital came. This was at a time
when the United States was a huge capital exporter, but the fall of the
United States from that position to a debtor nation appears to have
silenced the arguments in support of this approach in the United
States.
With respect to international trade there is first of all a general
rule that a country will not tax a foreign business unless that foreign
business has a "permanent establishment" in its territory. This means
that businesses which merely export goods and services to a second
country, without establishing any permanent presence there, are not
subject to tax in that second territory. This rule perhaps is based more
on convenience than taxation philosophy, but in fact it is a rule that is
absolutely essential at reducing international conflicts on which countries should tax the income associated with international trade: other
approaches lead quickly to chaos and conflict.
There is another important basic rule of the road with respect to
international trade, and that relates to determining how the total income from an international business should be allocated amongst the
countries in which that international business is conducted. The rule
specifies that "arm's length" prices for goods and services, and for capital, should be applied to determine the income earned by that international business in separate territories. For example, if a whisky manufacturer in Canada exported its products in bulk to the United States,
where the whisky was then bottled and resold, the whisky manufacturer would be called upon to set a fair and independent price at which
the bulk whisky from Canada is transferred to its United States subsidiary, so that the income of both the Canadian producer, and the U.S.
distributor, would be determined on the basis of that arm's length
transfer price. Each corporate identity will therefore earn a "fair" return on the activities which it carries on. This rule seems eminently
sensible, but the difficulty is in applying it. There is a huge and growing percentage of international trade that is carried on between members of the same corporate group, in circumstances where there is simply no objective arm's length price available in other markets. The
goods and services being sold between the affiliates are frequently semifinished products or sold in quantities and under trade conditions which
have no counterpart elsewhere. There are various approaches involving
reference to a fair division of the overall profit or rate of return test
that can be used to construct a "fair value" in such cases, but the results tend to be less than totally precise. Of course, any uncertainties
with respect to transfer prices are bound to lead to conflicts between
revenue-hungry governments over how the international tax pie should
be divided up.
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INTERNATIONAL TAX TREATIES

Despite these and other international tax rules, there remain a
host of possible conflicts, as well as opportunities for hardship and
avoidance, with respect to the inter-reaction of the differing tax systems
of two countries to a common income or capital flows, or to a business
that spans the two jurisdictions. To solve and reconcile these differences, countries around the world have entered into international tax
treaties - the total is now over 2,0005 - to provide definitive rules as to
how the transfer of goods, services, income and capital between the
signatories is to be treated. These international tax treaties have the
objectives of:
*resolving difficulties, anomalies and hardships due to differences between the tax systems;
*defining with clarity the tax rights of each of the two signatories, so
it becomes clear which country has the right to tax and when (The
corresponding relief provided by the other jurisdiction may also be
noted);
-providing favored status, such as lower withholding tax rates, than
would otherwise apply in the absence of the treaty;
*allowing the exchange of information, and reducing avoidance.
The overall purpose of tax treaties is to facilitate trade and investment
between the countries, and therefore they are an extremely important
building block in the new global system of commerce and investment.
Without them, the flow of capital, technology and knowledge, as well
as goods and services, between nations would be severely hindered, and
aggregate global wellbeing diminished.
THE

U.S. APPROACH TO TAX TREATIES

The U.S. has traditionally adopted a different approach to negotiating tax treaties than have other governments. The U.S. seems much
more concerned that its agreements represent an extension of U.S. policies. Tax treaties have therefore been used in an effort to reward
"good" foreign countries and reinforce U.S. foreign policies. Other
countries are more likely to simply want to strike a deal with another
country in order to help their own exporters and investors. As in other
areas of its international policies, the U.S. tends to be less flexible in its
approach to tax treaties than other nations. The U.S. has its own model
tax treaty, and - in good part - expects other countries to conform to its
norms. The result of course is that the United States has not been
wildly successful in negotiating tax treaties. The number of tax treaties
actually in force with the U.S. are fewer than the number entered into
5 Revenue

Canada Taxation, Provincial/International Relations Division, April 1994.
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by any of the U.S.'s major trading partners (except Japan)' and the
treaties that it does negotiate frequently require years of acrimonious
negotiations to conclude.

International Tax Treaties
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REVENUE CANADA
CANADA-UNITED STATES TAX RELATIONS

The generally constructive, but oft turbulent, story of the CanadaU.S. tax relations reflects these international norms but is strongly influenced by special influences that arise between the two countries.
First of all, the enormous volume of trade and investment between the
two countries is so large, as to necessarily give rise to complexities and
special circumstances. The task of reconciling tax issues between the
countries therefore becomes more difficult.
Secondly, a very large proportion of trade between Canada and
the United States is inter-company trade - between parents and subsidiaries, or between affiliates. This means that perhaps even more of the
trade than usual is carried on in goods and services where it is more
difficult to find an objective arm's length price, thereby increasing the
potential for disagreement between the two territories on how income

CANADA-UNITED

STATES LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 20:273 1994

should be allocated.
From the Canadian viewpoint, a particular issue is that Canadian
exports to the United States, and American investment in Canada is a
dominant feature of our economy. Over 80% of our exports go to the
United States and perhaps two-thirds of our foreign investment comes
from the United States.7 But as previously noted, the United States
finds that its exports to Canada and investment in Canada are important but not dominant parts of its overall trade. The result is an imbalance in the way that the two countries think about tax and other issues
related to their international relations: in Canada, these issues with the
U.S. tend to be of dominant importance in public policy while in the
United States the same issue can be merely one of a number that have
to be addressed in the realm of international relations, and even then is
clearly subservient to domestic concerns.
There are of course other potential clashes caused by differences in
attitude, or even philosophy between the two nations. The United
States, as the world's largest economy and the only remaining super
power, naturally considers that it has more of a right than most to
determine the rules of the road that apply to its international trade and
investment. In other words, the U.S. is much more likely, perhaps because of its concentration on internal concerns, to prefer to follow its
own policies even if they diverge from norms in international economic
matters. (I am certainly not implying of course that the U.S. is the
only country that does this: Canada and every other country also do so,
but are perhaps less able to be successful at it than is the United
States.) In a word, the United States has been known to throw its
weight around, and is basically less sensitive (and perhaps less knowledgeable) about the concerns and interests of other countries.
Canada of course has its own hangups, and is determined to adopt
measures affecting economic policy to maintain its cultural and political independence, most particularly from the United States: this is considered a natural counter-balance to the pull of economic gravity from
Canada being in the U.S. orbit. Canada also tends to be more pragmatic about trade and tax issues, because its focus is to make trade
work.
ARE FOREIGNERS RIPPING OFF THE

U.S.

TREASURY?

One particular issue worth a special mention is the continuing belief of a number of politicians in the United States that foreign companies are diverting revenue from the United States to their home country, with a consequent major loss of tax revenues to the United States.
This is an issue that has been referred to frequently and with great
fervor by U.S. politicians and commentators, including President Clin'

Statistics Canada, Cat. No. 65-001, Summary of International Trade (Dec. 1993).
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ton. In his pre-election platform, he pledged to get an additional $45
billion a year out of foreign investors through rigorous enforcement of
the tax rules, with this proposal being followed up by an idea for a
"minimum tax" on U.S. businesses owned by foreigners.8 (Both ideas
basically, and thankfully, went nowhere.)
The sometime U.S. obsession that foreign companies are massively
underpaying their fair share of U.S. taxation has, like most wrong
ideas, some germ of truth as its basis. A large number of international
companies, including those that are U.S. owned, have quite legally
taken advantage of international tax rules to earn income in tax havens
and other low tax jurisdictions, as well as taking other measures to
reduce their total tax bill on international income. But there is still no
credible evidence that, as a group, foreign investors in the United
States are systematically avoiding gargantuan amounts of U.S. tax.
Over the past 20 years, the United States has gradually moved
from the world's major capital exporter to a substantial net importer of
capital. Perennial U.S. federal deficits have been financed, in good part,
through the sale of securities to foreigners as the U.S. has struggled in
vain to put its fiscal house in order. The U.S. federal deficit is allegedly
declining to an extraordinarily high $220 billion, 9 and the United
States is naturally concerned about this (although the U.S. deficit is
still only about half as high, in relative terms, as are Canada's).

Tax Management Transfer Pricing magazine, 1-6-93.
OECD World Economic Outlook, No. 54 (Dec. 1993).
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It is appropriate that the United States will wish to take all measures
to maximize its tax revenues to try to overcome these deficits. But the
reality is that the United States has relatively low corporate rates of
tax, rates that are no higher than those prevailing in most of its trading
partners, including Canada. Accordingly, there is no obvious reasons
for many foreigners to divert income from the United States back to
their home territories in order to save taxes. (I do accept of course that
there are occasions when this diversion of income can be tax-effective,
as well as noting that there are instances in which income has been
shifted to tax havens).
The United States has a relatively low tax burden by international
standards, even though this is not widely recognized in the United
States, particularly around April 15. The general level of U.S. corporate income taxes is at least comparable to that of its major trading
partners. The United States also has no national sales tax, has relatively low personal income taxes, has extremely low taxes on gas, tobacco and certain other products, and overall has a tax burden that
most other countries around the world would envy: the U.S. citizens
pay a lower proportion of their income on taxes than do their counter-
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parts in almost all of the major countries that do business with the
United States." °
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Canada too is struggling with huge deficits: the combined federal
and provincial deficits this year will amount to $70 billion,", far worse
in relative terms than the corresponding figure in the United States.
Even worse, Canadian tax rates and burdens are already relatively high
by international standards making it more difficult for Canada to bring
its deficit problem under control through further increases in taxes. The
United States, with its relatively low burden of tax, could if it wished
eliminate its deficit through higher domestic taxes and still have a tax
burden that would not be out of line with most of its major trading
partners.' 2 Of course, the fact that the U.S. could get out of its deficit
problems through higher taxes does not mean that such higher taxes
could or even should be imposed; it simply means that the U.S. has an
10Borne out in summaries of WORLD ECONOMic FORUM, World Competitiveness Report,
supra note 1.
11 Revenue Canada.
12 Unlike most OECD members, the U.S. has no Value Added Tax
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option in this area that is not likely available to Canada. In fact, U.S.
taxpayers feel that they already bear a heavy burden of taxation and
substantially higher taxes are, at the moment, not a political possibility
in the United States. In addition, there are legitimate fears that any
such major tax increase would gravely injure the U.S.'s economic recovery. This, however, does illustrate that U.S. fiscal approaches have a
domestic focus, and even though U.S. trade balancing and deficit control policies have been partial failures, the domestic imperative of keeping down domestic taxes has led the U.S. to use foreign capital as one
of the whipping boys in the deficit debate. For similar reasons, the U.S.
continues to tend to blame a large part of its massive trade imbalance
on unfair foreign trade practices instead of on its own problems.
In the tax area, the U.S. combines some efficiencies in tax administration with some clear failures in tax design. The U.S. has an antiquated and perverse tax system, which:
*places heavy weight on income taxes, which apply to export earnings
-has very low reliance on consumption or sales taxes, which do not
apply to exports
-has a full double taxation of corporate income, once when earned by
the corporation and again when distributed as a dividend
o does not generally favor savings
With these inefficiencies, the U.S. might turn part of its attention inward in seeking the solution for some of its trade problems.
PROFITABILITY OF SUBSIDIARIES

With respect to the issue of tax base shifting between Canada and
the United States, it is interesting to contrast the position of U.S. subsidiaries in Canada, and Canadian subsidiaries in the United States.
The U.S. subsidiaries in Canada tend to be older, to have asset bases
which were in part acquired many years ago, and to have established
markets. Canadian subsidiaries in the United States tend, on the whole,
to be more recently founded: they have frequently purchased their asset
base recently, and in current dollars, and they have tended to finance a
larger part of that with borrowed money than U.S. subsidiaries in Canada which can operate in part through retained earnings. In these circumstances, it is not surprising that U.S. subsidiaries in Canada may
tend to earn a higher rate of return on assets and sales than corresponding and similar Canadian owned enterprises in the United States,
leading to the impression that U.S. income may be under-reported.
Of course, one could get into some interesting international conundrums about the correct way to apportion interest and some other fungible charges in an international business, but the point is still valid
that the relative unprofitability of some foreign-owned enterprises in
the United States is based on the highly competitive U.S. markets, high
levels of indebtedness, high asset prices, and in some cases lower levels
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of profitability in the United States relative to other countries.
CANADA FEARS U.S. TAX AGGRESSIVENESS

In Canada, as well as in other countries abroad, there are growing
fears of U.S. fiscal aggressiveness as the United States continues to
seek to improve its trade position internationally, and even its domestic
fiscal balance, through attacks on established trade and tax norms. Canada has a particular perception that we may be unfairly affected by
the fallout from the U.S. punitive approach to Japanese trade policies.
Canada, of course, has its own set of problems, basically a continuing Canadian ambivalence about our economic relationships with the
United States. On the one hand, Canada wants the benefits of close
U.S. association and even liked "special status" when we were able to
obtain it. Most Canadians admire the overall success of the United
States, including the dedication and drive of its entrepreneurs, and the
commitment to innovation of its economy.
But at the same time, Canada does want to preserve some independence of action and fears U.S. influence. The Canadian ego is also
frequently bruised by the fact that our country feels ignored in U.S.
political circles, while in Canada, issues relating to the United States
tend to dominate our news and our concerns. The new Canadian administration under Prime Minister Chretien is committed to maintaining more of an independent position with respect to relations with the
U.S. than was its predecessor. The basic Canadian policy of friendly
and open relations with the U.S. remains unchanged, but Mr. Chretien
is determined not to be perceived as subservient to U.S. interests. As
former Canadian Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau once said, sharing a
border with the U.S. is like sleeping with an elephant.
U.S.-CANADA TAX

CONFLICTS

It is against this background that I turn now to reviewing some
particular issues in Canada-U.S. tax relations. The big news in international tax issues these days is transfer prices - the determination of the

basis on which the total income of a multinational business is divided
up amongst the territories in which it carries on operations.
TRANSFER PRICES

In the broad area of international allocation of taxable income, the
U.S. has undeniably the most sophisticated, the most complex and the
lengthiest tax rules, backed up by the most capable enforcement. This
is not to say, however, that the U.S. system is perfect. In fact, a number of commentators, including myself, feel that the U.S. codified approach can create a bureaucratic nightmare of uncertainty and perversity. But the U.S. has addressed, more concretely than any other
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country, the transfer price issue, and very largely it has done so in the
context of aggressively seeking to expand the U.S. tax base.
A number of other countries, including Canada, see the United
States and its revised Section 482 regulations 18 and numerous other
developments, as edging away from accepted international norms in an
approach that could have the effect of eroding their own tax base in
favor of that of the United States. Indeed, the Canadian authorities
became so apprehensive about the new U.S. income allocation rules
that Revenue Canada took the virtually unprecedented step, in January
1994, of noting the developments in the United States, and publicly
announcing that transfer prices and other issues that might be determined under the new U.S. rules would not necessarily be regarded as
acceptable for Canadian tax purposes since Canada did not support the
basis on which the U.S. rules were prepared.1 4 This warning gun by the
Canadian tax authorities means that taxpayers engaged in international trade between Canada and the United States are put in considerable jeopardy. Regardless of what basis they follow in determining the
allocation of income flowing from trade between Canada and the
United States, they run the risk of having the tax authorities of one or
the other, or perhaps both countries, objecting to the basis. This situation is particularly severe with respect to any possible alleged understatement of U.S. income, since the U.S. rules contain horrendous penalty provisions.
The U.S. has adopted an innovative advance pricing determination
procedure, in which taxpayers can obtain advance clearance of pricing
methodology on trans-border transactions - but of course these taxpayers have no assurance that such pricing methods would be accepted by
Canada or any other foreign government. In the case of Canada-U.S.
trade, taxpayers who find the two governments at loggerheads on how
the income pie should be divided up can have reference to the competent authority provisions in the existing Canada-U.S. tax treaty, but
again without assurance that the two governments, evidently committed to different methodologies, can come to an agreement (The taxpayer has no right to compel the governments to reach an agreement in
a Canada-U.S. transfer price dispute, and hence has no assurance
against economic double taxation. However, in the past the component
authority provision has worked relatively effectively, if slowly.).
The angels are not all on one side in this conflict of views. Other
countries, including Canada, have been in the past notoriously lax
about international transfer pricing issues. Further, the adherence to an
"arm's length" price standard for international income allocations can
Temporary regulations issued under Internal Revenue Code Section 482, Jan. 21, 1993.
14 Press Release entitled Transfer Pricing Rules and Guidelines Clarified, issued Jan,

1994.
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legitimately be challenged in an era where increasingly there is no market-determined independent arm's length price to wich to refer, even
indirectly. But because the U.S. is in the lead in both the sophistication
that approaches international pricing issues, and the resources that it
expends in policing such issues, it is nevertheless likely to obtain a net
advantage in enforcement activities with other countries with less developed tax capabilities. To the United States, this is not seen as unfair
or untoward, while to others it seems like a threat to their domestic tax
base and economic wellbeing.
The intensive U.S. efforts on transfer pricing issues are of course
in part a legitimate response to over-exuberant international tax planning and the diversion of income to tax havens or low tax jurisdictions.
But overall, the approach of the U.S. has tended to create more difficulties in pricing issues between the U.S. and other jurisdictions than
apply generally in the tax relations between countries. 15
FOREIGN TAX CREDIT

The U.S. foreign tax credit is a complex part of the U.S. tax code.
In general terms, the U.S. foreign tax credit rules have been changed
on a number of occasions in recent years, to limit the tax credit available to U.S. companies in respect of the foreign taxes paid on their income. The result of course is an inducement for U.S. companies to shift
income from abroad into the United States, since increasingly they
have failed to obtain full credit against their U.S. tax for foreign taxes
paid and therefore can be subject to "double taxation" on foreign
source income. Some of the changes in the foreign tax credit computations under the Internal Revenue Code do rest on a reasonable intellectual basis, but again they tend to be in advance of - or at least different
from - those employed by other countries, and inevitably they give rise
to concerns abroad as to the motivation for such changes.
UNITARY TAX

A particular thorn in the side of foreign investors in the United
States is the so-called unitary tax issue. In past years, a number of
states in the United States, and most notably California, adopted a unitary tax approach to the taxation of corporate income. This approach
was to ignore all issues of arm's length pricing, and instead to calculate
the base for - say California corporate tax - as a portion of the world-

wide income of an entire associated corporate group, if any member of
"

These and subsequent comments regarding overall U.S. tax relations with other countries

are related to general directions enunciated in a U.S. policy paper entitled, Tax Compliance in a
Global Economy - Statement of Policy and Action Plan, co-authored by the Hon. Leslie B. Samuels, Assistant Secretary (Tax Policy) U.S. Department of Treasury; and the Hon. Margaret Milner Richardson, Commissioner, Internal Revenue Service. (Dec. 1993).
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that group did any business in California. (The position of the worldwide income that was regarded as being earned in California was determined by applying a formula percentage to total consolidated income, with that percentage being determined by factors related to the
percentage of revenue, wages and/or assets in the jurisdiction to total
consolidated revenue, wages, and assets. Of course, the unitary approach was applied precisely because it tended to increase corporate
tax revenues - allegedly up to $500 million a year in California alone.
The unitary tax approach was particularly resented by foreign based
multinationals who felt that this approach was a clear contradiction of
the arm's length apportionment basis in their tax treaties with the
United States, a basis on which international tax harmony depended,
as well as being a blatant effort by California and some other states to
garner revenue.
This is an old issue in California, and other states using this approach have moved away from it in recent years. California itself
largely abandoned the concept last October, showing that its economic
recession and the resentment of foreign companies had helped drive
home the cost of being different in the international tax game. But the
fact that this method was applied for many years, without the intervention of the U.S. federal government, is still a major irritation abroad,
and it is the subject of a tax case recently heard before the U.S. Supreme Court - the Barclays/Colgatecase. The issues are complex, but,
if the Supreme Court decides in favor of California (as expected) and
rules out tax refunds on the unitary assessments on multinationals in
past years, a number of foreign countries may retaliate, and raise taxes
on U.S. corporations doing business in their jurisdictions. While Canada has supported the opposition to the unitary tax method, we are
not likely to join in such retaliation, but the fallout could mean a new
international tax war with adverse implications to trade and investment
around the world.
WITHHOLDING TAXES

A major irritant to the U.S. in the continuing tax policy conflict
with Canada has been the fact that Canada has generally higher withholding taxes on income flows to the United States than the so-called
OECD norms. It is indeed true that Canada does have higher withholding taxes, in a number of areas, on income flows to the United States
than would be recommended as the norm under the OECD model
treaty. Of course, the withholding tax rates on Canadian income flows
abroad have been dropping in recent years, as have those of other countries, as part of an overall program to facilitate international investment. Some four years ago, Canada finally opted to offer other countries a withholding tax rate of 5% on dividend flows from direct
investments in Canada, on a reciprocal basis, bringing this critical fea-

Brown & Alexander-MODERN AGE

ture of Canadian tax policy in line with the OECD. However, Canada
was only prepared to phase-in this lower rate, down from the thenstandard 10% in the U.S. and many other tax treaties, over a period of
four years.
In general, Canada has been reluctant to drop its withholding tax
rates as low as the United States (and some other countries) would
like. The first concern is revenue: cutting withholding tax rates means
giving up scarce tax dollars at a time of sky-high deficits. And it means
giving up revenue in an unbalanced way. Canada is a debtor nation and
income flows of dividends, rents, royalties and interest from Canada to
abroad are far greater than the corresponding flows into Canada. Lowering taxes on such flows therefore involves Canada giving up bigger
benefits to other countries, notably the United States, than its own corporations and citizens would obtain. Of course, it can be argued - and
it has been by the United States - that such lowering of tax rates is
simply part of the global trend to facilitate international capital investment, and implement the philosophy underlying NAFTA. The U.S.
would contend that Canada would benefit from such a move; however,
with its ambivalent view of foreign investment, Canada is not entirely
sure that it wants to totally facilitate incoming capital, at least not to
the extent of giving up important tax rights on it.
U.S.

ESTATE TAXES

Estate taxes are a particular, if relatively minor, issue in Canada/
U.S. tax relations, but serve an excellent illustration of how differences
in the tax systems of two countries can create tax issues. The United
States has a general estate tax, levying fairly substantial taxes on the
estates of deceased U.S. citizens, and foreigners owning certain types of
property in the United States. However, the U.S. does not impose any
tax on the unrealized appreciation of capital assets held by a deceased
at the date of death. Those assets are generally taken over, at current
fair value, by the beneficiaries of the deceased and so the capital gains
tax that would have applied on this appreciation is forgiven. Canada on
the other hand has no general estate tax or succession duties at death,
nor do the Canadian provinces. Instead, Canadians are taxed on the
deemed realization of all of their capital assets, at fair value, at the
date of death, with some limited postponement rules.
The two different approaches have their adherents, but the real
issue is that the difference in tax policy can lead to particular cases of
"double tax" since, in estates subject to both jurisdictions, the Canadian deemed realization tax is not offsettable against U.S. estate tax,
and the U.S. estate tax is not creditable against Canadian capital gains
tax.
When the U.S. extended its estate tax grasp in 1988, a larger
number of Canadians became subject to U.S. estate tax on certain U.S.
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assets, including most notably Canadian snowbirds owning real estate
in Florida and other U.S. southern states. The concern has been so
widespread as to actually induce some Canadians to give up their U.S.
properties, with a possible depressing influence on certain local real estate markets.
CULTURE

Another issue in tax relations between Canada and the United
States is the vexing subject of culture. Canadian tax rules favor Canadian ownership of media and "cultural" businesses, hampering the ability of U.S. operators to extend their operations to Canada. For example, advertising placed by Canadians in even a Canadian publication
that has primarily foreign content can be disallowed for Canadian tax
purposes. The U.S. views these policies as discrimination against the
U.S. and its enterprises. There is of course a basic difference in Canadian and American viewpoints: the United States not unnaturally views
movies, television and video, recorded music and general entertainment
as a business, and it is a business at which the U.S. clearly excels.
Canada tends to look upon such matters as impacting culture, and it is
the clear basis of Canadian policy to retain Canadian flavor in this area
and prevent Canadians from being swamped with imports from the
United States. All these perennial conflicts are brought into a sharper
focus within the context of a worldwide recession, political upheaval,
and widespread uncertainty.
EXTRA-TERRITORIALITY

The United States, in the tax area as well as other areas, tends to
cast its tax net around the world. The U.S. is more active in the tax
field outside its own border than any other country:
0 The U.S. is one of the few countries to use citizenship as well as
residence as a basis of taxation. Hundreds of thousands of U.S. citizens living and working abroad remain liable for U.S. taxes, with
inevitable complexities created in the tax relations between the U.S.
and other nations.
o The U.S. is the only country to routinely send tax auditors abroad,
to check the income of U.S. citizens and companies.
o The U.S. requires a far greater amount of reporting on the foreign
operations and investments of its companies than do other countries.
The result is that, again, there is more likely to be an inter-reaction of
U.S. and foreign tax law and policies, and strains on international
relations.
CANADA

U.S. TAX TREATY

The traditional way to resolve tax conflicts between jurisdictions is
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a tax treaty, and, by and large, Canada and the United States have
been able to resolve the majority of the tax issues between them in a
peaceful and constructive manner. It is only against this background
that we note the tax issues where the two countries have not yet been
able to reach agreement and which are still festering sores on the general body of reasonably healthy economic cooperation.
The first tax treaty between Canada and the United States was
signed back in 1940, and it took another 40 years before the two countries got together to revise and expand their tax agreement in the present 1980 treaty. The new treaty was no sooner signed than various
issues required further amendments, but the task of further updating
the tax treaty - which is a continuing task in a fast changing world has languished since the mid-1980's. In fact, the two countries have
been in negotiations on revisions to the present treaty since 1988, but,
despite numerous meetings, the two jurisdictions are still relatively far
apart on a number of critical issues. Of course, any tax treaty changes
involving such immense volumes of trade and investment will take
awhile to negotiate because of the complexities of the issues involved
and the sensitivity of not only the economic but the political tradeoffs
required. Five years of treaty negotiations are a mere blink of a gnat's
eye in terms of the glacial speed of bureaucrats, but the fear is that it
could take many more years before the two countries are able to come
to an agreement on the resolution of important tax issues that are outstanding between them.
IssuEs AGREED

The discussions to date are understood to have led to some measure of agreement between the parties on particular points. The most
important agreement is on withholding taxes on direct dividends - dividends paid by subsidiaries in one country to parent companies and
other substantial shareholders in the other where the rate of withholding tax will be reduced from the present 10% to 5%. At Canada's
insistence, this reduction in withholding tax will only be achieved at the
rate of 1% a year, and even then this countdown of withholding tax
rates will not begin until agreement is achieved on a revised treaty. The
cut in dividend withholding rates provides larger dollar benefits to U.S.
investors, since the U.S. has more in the way of direct investment in
Canada than does Canada in the United States. The delay in reaching
agreement on the treaty is therefore costing major American investors
significant amounts, together with a substantial amount of chagrin as
Canada has managed to renegotiate its tax treaties with other countries
to permit their investors to begin to enjoy lower withholding tax rates
from Canada while U.S. investors can only dream about these future
benefits.
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The discussions between Canada and the United States have also
led to a preliminary agreement to provide some limited relief for
Canadians from U.S. estate tax: the changes are not likely to give Canadian snowbirds with Florida condominiums a complete exemption,
but they are understood to provide some elements of relief. In addition,
the two parties have agreed on a zero withholding on some software
payments, and possibly on certain types of arm's length royalties.
ISSUES NOT RESOLVED

Unfortunately, there is a fairly significant list of issues on which
the two sides have not reached agreement. In terms of what the U.S.
wants out of the treaty which Canada to date has not been prepared to
concede, the list includes:
-The U.S. would like a lower withholding tax on some interest payments between the two countries. At present, most interest on longterm debt paid abroad from Canada is exempt from withholding tax,
but a tax of 10% is levied on most short term interest (including
interest on current bank borrowings) and on non arm's length payments. The U.S. would like this rate reduced to 5 % (or actually
4.99 % due to the vagaries of some U.S. internal tax rules), or possibly 0%, and this is strongly supported by U.S. banks. Canada is
resisting, on the grounds it would involve some net revenue loss from
Canada and perhaps on the basis that some level of withholding tax
on short term interest is necessary to preserve an independent monetary policy in Canada.
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-The U.S. is also seeking lower withholding taxes (likely 5% or 0 %,
from the present 10%) on non arm's length royalties - typically payments from Canadian subsidiaries to their U.S. parent companies.
This change, it is contended, would result in a freer technology flow
across the border, benefitting both Canada and the United States.
-With respect to the arguments for lower withholding on both interest and certain royalties, Canada may be apprehensive that any further lowering of withholding tax rates may encourage American
companies to institute new levels of charges to Canadian affiliates,
with a consequent erosion of the Canadian tax base.
*The U.S. also wants to introduce a so-called "anti treaty-shopping"
clause in the treaty, which would limit treaty benefits on flows from
the United States to Canadian companies owned by Canadians.
However, Canada has objected to the particular language being
sought by the United States, which could place some Canadian companies in which third party nationals have a strong interest, at a disadvantage. And of course there are the perennial cultural issues
where the U.S. may be seeking some relaxation on Canadian rules
relating to the media.
-In the negotiations, Canada is probably still seeking a somewhat
better break on estate tax for Canadians owning U.S. assets. Canada
also wants better treatment of the U.S. branches of Canadian banks
and insurance companies, because these entities have been hard hit
by recent U.S. tax changes relating to interest and other factors.
Throughout, Canada has been arguing that its sovereignty, its cultural
identity, and its tax base must be preserved, while the U.S. has been
seeking to break down the remaining rules restricting Canada-U.S. investment and to bring the Canada-U.S. trans-border tax more in accordance with the OECD norms.
The two sides met again in Ottawa in June but various conflicts
remain, primarily because of not only the different interests of the two
parties, but because of different views on what sovereignty in the tax
area really means. The U.S. has taken a view that sovereignty means
generally lower rates of tax in treaties, but still preserves the basic U.S.
right to administer its tax system domestically as it chooses. Canada
believes that legitimate sovereignty includes a concern for a preservation of the Canadian identity, both from a cultural and an economic
viewpoint.
WITHHOLDING TAXES - TARIFFS ON KNOWLEDGE AND CAPITAL?

The discussions taking place between Canada and the United
States may illustrate some further differences of viewpoints between
the countries on international tax issues. The United States may argue,
with some considerable intellectual support, that in a free trade area
where countries have already agreed that goods may freely pass across

294

CANADA-UNITED STATES LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 20:273 1994

borders without payment of tariffs, it is inconsistent with these policies
that there should be the equivalent of a tariff on the transfer of knowledge, technology and capital across borders. Withholding taxes levied
on payments of interest, dividends and royalties are in fact equivalent
to tariffs, and have the same effect as tariffs in restricting the free flow
of technology, knowledge and capital across international boundaries.
(Such withholding taxes may not represent an additional net tax cost to
the recipient if he can obtain full credit for them in his country of
residence, but in an increasingly complicated world, many recipients
will not be able to obtain such a tax offset, and hence the withholding
tax, to these people, does represent an additional tax and therefore a
barrier.)
Within the European economic community, there has been careful
attention to the need to dismantle and ultimately eliminate withholding
taxes and other tax barriers on income flows, at the same time that
tariffs and other barriers for the free exchange of goods are being eliminated. The United States may therefore legitimately raise the question
of why its free trade agreements with Canada should not be accompanied by a movement towards zero withholding tax rates on interest,
dividends and royalties. But Canada might respond that the elimination
of tariffs (and the ultimate elimination of withholding taxes) within the
EEC have occurred in a regime that has a binding international mechanism for resolving trade and tax disputes between parties, therefore
adding substance and assurance to the working of an effective free
trade arrangement. Canada at the moment certainly feels that even its
free trade arrangements with the United States have a less-than-satisfactory dispute reconciliation arrangement, and certainly would argue
that there is no mechanism for a binding independent arbitration of
international tax disputes under agreed standards. Indeed, Canada
could point out that the United States has been adamantly opposed to
such binding dispute resolution approaches, on the grounds that they
derogate from national law and national sovereignty. With its fears
about the transfer pricing issues and its concerns on other fronts, Canada might be unwilling to tread down the path towards free trade in
capital and technology without some assurance of the existence of effective, and therefore independent and binding, dispute reconciliation
processes.
INTERNATIONAL TRANSFER PRICES

An issue that would certainly have been mentioned in the tax
treaty discussions, but probably not resolved in that arena, is the continuing concern of Canada, along with other U.S. trading partners,
about the international transfer pricing issues. The U.S. approach, as
conveyed in the proposed 1994 Section 42 regulations, is viewed by
many as moving away from the basic "arm's length" criteria in inter-
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national trade while the U.S. feels that its changes simply provide a
more sophisticated and effective way of dealing with international tax
avoidance. A tax treaty is not necessarily the way to resolve such transfer pricing concerns, as the U.S. has always felt that its transfer pricing
rules were largely a domestic issue and not subject to modification in
international agreements. Taxpayers would prefer a more effective way
of resolving international transfer price disputes, but the U.S. again has
always ruled out binding arbitration on such issues which it regards as
relating to the application of U.S. domestic law.
TRADE ISSUES

It is beyond the scope of this paper to deal with the perennial
trade issues in conflict between Canada and the United States - wheat,
softwood, steel, etc. - but it is worth noting that tax issues must be set
against the background of these continuing trade disagreements and
that in particular Canada has some concern about the continuing commitment of the U.S., in a highly politicized domestic environment, to
actually implement effective, independent arbitration of disputes under
international rules.
CONCLUSION

As I said at the outset, it is all too tempting and too easy to concentrate on the difficult issues that inevitably arise in respect of the
conflicting sovereignties of Canada and the United States. In fact, the
vast majority of transactions of all sorts that occur between our two
countries are dealt with, for tax purposes, effectively and with appropriate coordination between the two jurisdictions. However, it is the exceptions that get the noise and it is the exceptions that sometimes create ripples in the otherwise harmonious relations between the two
countries, ripples that can grow and cause some ultimate rocking of the
boat.
In a world that is still based on the absolute sovereignty of nation
states, both Canada and the United States preserve the ultimate rights
of sovereignty, in the tax as well as in other areas. These rights are,
however, beginning to fray around the edges as each country binds itself, more and more, into an international web of treaties, agreements,
policies and understandings that gradually begin to restrict its freedom
of decision, not merely on international issues but inevitably extending
into so-called domestic matters which have international ramifications.
Both Canada and the United States are finding, as are all other countries, that while the ultimate concept of sovereignty remains, the cost of
sovereignty keeps on going up. The right to be independent is still there
but the exercise of that right, in any arbitrary way, is bound to cost
any country more and more as the global community assumes further
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shape and authority.
It is against this background of the urgent incentives to reconcile
tax differences that conflicts between the United States and Canada
should be noted. Most of the tax conflicts between Canada and the
United States have been worked out between the two countries, primarily through the tax treaty, and the remaining differences should be
dealt with in the same way.
It will require a commitment to cooperation and the willingness on
both sides to appreciate the viewpoint of the other in order to make this
cooperation effective. The will to be cooperative is certainly there: what
is needed in the future is more understanding and more commitment to
reconciliation, in order to achieve the common benefits of economic
cooperation.
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